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THE UNEXAMINED MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR
BUSINESS: CONGRESSIONAL AND STATE
LEGISLATIVE PILOT PROJECTS
William Wesley Patton*
Congress and state legislatures annually spend hundreds of billions
of dollars on pilot projects to determine whether those small experiments
warrant expansion into nation-wide or state-wide implementation.  Un-
fortunately, there are currently few pre-approval methodologies and
even fewer interim and final assessment instruments required before pi-
lot project contracts are finalized.  The result is that often the pilot pro-
ject studies produce data and outcome measures that are not useful in
determining whether to scale-up the programs.  This study compares sev-
eral federal and state pilot projects and suggests new pilot project re-
quirements that will permit policy makers to better analyze the benefits
of these experiments, more easily compare similar pilot projects, and
determine longitudinal assessments of these legislative mandates in or-
der to avoid economic waste.
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INTRODUCTION
Each year Congress and state legislatures approve hundreds of bil-
lions of dollars for experimental projects and programs.1  These projects
receive various labels, such as pilot programs, pilot projects, demonstra-
tion projects or programs, pilot experiments, and pilot studies.2  The use
of terminology to describe these legislative experiments is not consistent
among different state jurisdictions or even within legislative committees
in the same state.3  For simplicity, this Article will use the term “pilot
project” and “pilot program” to refer to all of these variously labeled
statutory authorizations.4
1 See infra text accompanying notes 14–20, for a discussion of the cumulative cost of
pilot projects throughout the nation.  Until recently, empirical research on the effectiveness of
different types of funding sources for social services was not a primary focus of governmental
grants.  For instance, “[p]ublic health law research usually focuses on the substantive laws that
effect health, not the accompanying funding law.”  Susan Mangold et al., Public Health Law
Research: Measuring the Impact of Sources and Types of Funding on Health Care Outcomes
for Children in Foster Care in Ohio, http://publichealthlawresearch.org/project/measuring-im
pact-sources-and-types-funding-health-care-outcomes-children-foster-care-ohio.  Newer stud-
ies, however, are beginning to analyze whether “the source and/or type of funding, not just the
amount of funding, impact[s] health outcomes.” Id.
2 Some use the term “pilot experiment” as a general category that includes other types
of temporary or termed small-scale legislative trials such as “pilot programs” and smaller ex-
periments termed “pilot projects.”  Raphae¨l Bille´, Action Without Change? On the Use and
Usefulness of Pilot Experiments in Environmental Management, SAPIENS, July 10, 2010, at 1,
2–3, available at http://sapiens.revues.org/index979.html. See also Edwin R. van Teijlingen &
Vanora Hundley, The Importance of Pilot Studies, SOCIAL RESEARCH UPDATE, Winter 2001,
available at http://sru.soc.surrey.ac.uk/SRU35.html; Lehana Thabane et al., A Tutorial on Pilot
Studies: The What, Why, and How, BMC MED. RES. METHODOLOGY, vol. 10, 2010, available
at http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/10/1.
3 One of the main difficulties of studying pilot projects is the lack of consistent defini-
tion even within specific fields of study.  For instance, one analysis of medical pilot projects
found that there was “no formal methodological guidance as to what constitutes a pilot study,”
and that even journal editors that publish pilot studies “said that they had no publication pol-
icy.”  Gillian A. Lancaster et al., Design and Analysis of Pilot Studies: Recommendations for
Good Practices, 10 J. EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 307, 308–09 (2004).
4 This Article will not analyze the largest funded research projects, often called “demon-
stration” projects, but rather will focus on the smaller and more numerous pilot projects.  Dem-
onstration projects also receive billions of federal dollars a year.  For instance, the Department
of Health and Human Services (HHS) alone has seen the number and budget for demonstration
projects increase.  In 2008, HHS provided 2,311 demonstration grants for a total of
$1,052,778,855. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS, HHS GRANT AWARDS FISCAL
YEAR 2008, at 19 ( 2009), available at http://taggs.hhs.gov/AnnualReport/FY2008/documents/
TAGGS_2008_Annual_Report.pdf.  By 2010, the number of HHS demonstration grants in-
creased to 2,755 for a total of $1,532,430. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
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Pilot project5 legislation can be characterized by the following vari-
ables: (1) the experiment has a limited temporal duration, usually be-
tween one to four years; (2) it usually has a limited geographical
designation rather than being state-wide or nation-wide in implementa-
tion;6 (3) it is designed to test a limited scope of new ideas, practices and/
or policies;7 and (4) it is often a political compromise that results from
the failure to obtain sufficient legislative support for a permanent and/or
more expansive legislative mandate.  Reducing a fully implemented pro-
gram to a pilot project is perceived in some cases as a way for a politi-
cian to maintain credibility in the face of opposition to the author’s
legislation.  “[C]alling an initiative a pilot project has long been under-
stood as giving a project permission to fail.  The term lessens the ac-
countability of the politician proposing the project since it is merely an
experiment.”8
Pilot projects potentially provide significant social benefits and
methodologies that can increase the chances that new ideas can be suc-
cessfully implemented.9  Pilot projects can: (1) foster teamwork; (2)
identify and train leaders and personnel for future projects; (3) provide
realistic cost projections for expanding the pilot studies; (4) identify vari-
TAGGS 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2010), available at http://taggs.hhs.gov/AnnualReport/
FY2010/documents/TAGGS_2010_Annual_Report.pdf.  I will leave for a different article the
important differences between accountability variables and concerns about demonstration
projects.
5 “The term pilot study is used in two different ways in social science research.  It can
refer to so-called feasibility studies which are ‘small scale version[s], or trial run[s], done in
preparation for the major study’ . . . .  However, a pilot study can also be the pre-testing or
‘trying out’ of a particular research instrument . . . .”  van Teijlingen & Hundley, supra note 2, R
at 2.
6 Bille´, supra note 2, at 2.  Although most pilot studies are used to determine whether R
full scale implementation should progress, sometimes so little is known about a topic that a
pre-pilot study is required.  For an excellent example of a small pre-pilot study see MICHAEL
W. FINIGAN ET AL., CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, PHASE II PILOT STUDY: NEEDS ASSESSMENT
AND COST ELEMENTS 1, available at http://www.npcresearch.com/Files/Civil_Right_to_Coun
sel_Phase_II_Pilot_Study_0610.pdf.  For instance, that pre-large scale pilot project determined
that the full-scale pilot project would take more time because “full court records are not pub-
licly available” and they needed “more staff hours to obtain needed access to court records.”
Id. at 22.
7 Larry Hirschorn, Campaigning for Change, HARV. BUS. REV., July 2002, at 98, 103.
8 Karl Schulz, Evaluating the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007: Inclu-
sions, Exclusions, and Problems with Implementation, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANAL.
10763, 10764 (2008).
9 Some have demonstrated the benefits of microsimulation analysis even prior to the
design and implementation of small pilot projects.  Microsimulation analysis “‘involves mod-
eling the impact of governmental programs at the level at which they are intended to operate’
That is, microsimulation looks at the impact of government programs on the relevant individ-
ual decision units.”  David H. Greenberg et al., Using Microsimulation to Help Design Pilot
Demonstrations: An Illustration from the Canadian Self-Sufficiency Project, 19 EVALUATION
REV. 687, 692 (1995) (citations omitted).  In effect, microsimulation analysis helps determine
the best designs for pilot projects, and thus increases the chances a successful experiment.
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ables necessary for expansion into statewide or nationwide programs;10
(5) determine shared interests among disparate communities or constitu-
ents; (6) encourage innovation in stagnant systems in which status quo
incentives thrive;11 and (7) reduce economic waste by testing theory and
implementation in a reduced environment rather than in a full-scale
model.12  Pilot projects can also expedite smaller governmental experi-
ments “unencumbered by the red tape and budget line items” inherent in
larger programs and the political difficulty of gaining consensus.13
Academics have provided almost no analysis of governmental pilot
projects.  Analyses and “[f]ull reports of pilot studies are rare in the re-
search literature.”14  Thus, the various empirical variables inherent in pi-
lot projects have been inadequately investigated, including: (1) their
frequency and patterns of use over time; (2) whether the number and size
of pilot projects cycle consistently with economic trends or whether they
are relatively constant in number and/or the size of their budgets; (3)
what is the success rate of pilot projects, and does their success rate jus-
tify that economic investment; (4) what quality controls have been estab-
lished to judge and assess their success or failure; and (5) how have
legislative term limits affected legislative sponsors’ accountability re-
10 Of course, not all pilot projects seek data that is generalizable to larger scale imple-
mentation.  There is a difference in purpose and design “between implementation science that
aims to produce generalizable knowledge and quality improvement projects that aim to pro-
duce local knowledge with a focus on an organization’s own delivery system and process.”
Ken Cheung & Naihua Duan, Design of Implementation Studies for Quality Improvement Pro-
grams: An Effectiveness—Cost-Effectiveness Framework, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 23, 23
(2014).
11 MARIA DAKOLIAS & JAVIER SAID, JUDICIAL REFORM: A PROCESS OF CHANGE
THROUGH PILOT COURTS 2–4 (1999).
12 Pilot projects as investments permit a “limit [of] its losses in case of negative out-
comes, while maintaining the profits resulting from more favorable scenarios.”  Eymen Errais
& Jeffrey Sadowsky, Valuing Pilot Projects in a Learning by Investing Framework: An Ap-
proximate Dynamic Programming Approach, 35 COMPUTERS & OPERATIONS RESEARCH 90,
91–92 (2008), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1268209.  The economic cost/
benefit ratio of pilot projects can shift during the pilot timeline.  “[I]ncreasing the learning
coefficient while keeping the average technical volatility across pilot stages constant adds
value and increases the incentive to invest in early pilot stages, while it does the opposite in
later pilot stages.” Id. at 110.
13 Amber Corrin, Cleared for Takeoff: How Pilot Projects Are Fast-Tracking Mobile
Tech, FCW, Apr. 15, 2013, at 20, 21, available at http://fcw.com/articles/2013/04/11/dod-mo-
bility-pilot-programs.aspx.  In one Department of Defense small pilot project involving the
investigation of hand held devices, Michael McCarthy, director of operations at the Army
Brigade Modernization Command, stated that he “‘never sat down and totaled how much
we’ve spent on mobile projects.’” Id. at 22.
14 van Teijlingen & Hundley, supra note 2, at 3.  “[T]he literature is somewhat limited in R
providing a well-defined structured methodology on how a pilot study should be used” since
most studies focus on results/findings, not methodology.  Raktim Pal et al., Role of Pilot Study
in Assessing Viability of New Technology Projects: The Case of RFID in Parking Operations,
23 COMMC’NS ASS’N FOR INFO. SYS. 257, 259 (2008).
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garding their authored pilot projects that may not conclude before their
political terms expire?
This Article will begin to sketch the parameters of legislative pilot
projects, determine the quantitative trends between the early 1990s and
2010, identify variables of pilot project success and failure, and isolate
the most relevant variables in determining the assessment of pilot project
results and factors which help predict pilot project success.
I. THE FREQUENCY, PATTERN, AND COST OF PILOT PROJECTS
BETWEEN THE 1990S AND 2009–2010
One of the frustrations inherent in the study of pilot projects is the
lack of databases that exist to track their frequency, cost, and results.
Even if one attempts to analyze the etiology and evolution of a single bill
giving rise to a pilot project, it may be almost impossible to determine
basic data such as the actual pilot project budget.  For example, the Cali-
fornia Legislature passed the Performance and Results Act of 1993,15
which created “pilot testing performance budgeting in four departments,”
and the pilot study was to be completed by 1996.16  The full pilot project
report, however, was not submitted in a timely manner, and the Califor-
nia Legislative Analyst’s Office’s report on the project merely noted that
“Significant [r]esources [h]ave [b]een [i]nvested” in the pilot project, and
that although it recommended that the Department of Finance estimate
the costs of the pilot project, “no such estimate has been provided.”17
The Legislative Analyst’s Office again recommended that “the depart-
ment provide the Legislature a status report on the pilot program at the
time of the budget hearings.”18  No report on the actual costs of the pilot
project was ever produced,19 but it was noted that many of the actual
15 1993 Cal. Stat. 3738 (Cal. 1993).
16 1996-1997 Budget Analysis: Statewide Administrative Crosscutting Issues, LEGIS. AN-
ALYST’S OFFICE, http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis_1996/a96hcc.html (last visited Nov. 15,
2014).
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 It is not unusual for pilot project budgets to be non-transparent.  For instance, even
though California Assembly Bill 1102 (February 25, 1999) created eight pilot projects to test
environmental management systems, see A.B. 1102, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999), availa-
ble at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/ab_1101-1150/ab_1102_bill_19990706_
chaptered.html, in none of the six annual reports issued between 1999 and 2001, nor in the
final January 3, 2003 report, were the specific cumulative costs and savings of the pilot
projects discussed. See Archives, 1999–2003 Publications: CalEPA Agency Wide Environ-
mental Management System, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.calepa.ca.gov/EMS/
Archives/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).  “Only two pilots provided economic data on the costs
and benefits of EMS implementation.  Further, the data provided was limited especially when
identifying costs of EMS implementation.” ENVTL. MGMT. AND SUSTAINABILITY PROGRAM
INNOVATION INITIATIVE, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT ON THE CAL/EPA ENVIRONMEN-
TAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PROJECT 64 (2003), available at http://www.calepa.ca.gov/EMS/
Archives/2003/LegReport/FinalReport.pdf [hereinafter CAL/EPA REPORT].
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costs, like the costs that departments “absorb[ed],” such as staff time and
consultants’ costs, were beyond and in addition to the formal pilot pro-
ject budget.20
In addition to the incomplete legislative reporting on pilot projects,
neither the federal government nor any state legislature requires an an-
nual compilation of the cumulative number, types, costs, or results of
pilot projects.  Research on pilot projects at this stage remains relatively
ad hoc and methodologically challenged.  However, the following analy-
sis begins to sketch the scope, costs, strengths, and weaknesses of the
current legislative pilot project process.
A. Trends in Federal Pilot Projects
The number of Congressional pilot projects increased substantially
between the 1991–1992 Congressional term and the 2009–2010 term.21
The results demonstrated a 68% increase in the number of funded pilot
studies during that period:22
FEDERAL PILOT PROJECTS
1991-1992 2009-2010 Percent Change
Pilot Project 81 132 +62.9%
Pilot Program 306 572 +86.9%
Total 387 704 +81.9%
TABLE 1
B. Trends in State Pilot Projects
Unlike federal pilot project legislation, there was not a consistent
increase in the number of pilot projects in every state legislature during
the same time period.  In fact, although some jurisdictions realized large
increases, other states approved fewer pilot projects in 2009–2010 than
in the early 1990s.23  Therefore, there was a 45% total increase in the
20 CAL/EPA REPORT, supra note 19, at 50. R
21 The study consisted of a search of the terms “pilot project” and “pilot program” for
two time periods of federal legislation, 1991–1992 and 2009–2010. See, THOMAS SEARCH
BILL TEXT, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/home/LegislativeData.php?&n=BillText
(last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
22 In a subsequent paper, I intend to provide a more sophisticated analysis of pilot project
trends that will track relevant year-to-year comparative variables such as: (1) which political
party had a majority in Congress or in different state legislatures and (2) how various eco-
nomic indicators such as inflation, the consumer price index, the stock exchange valuations,
trade deficits, and the national debt affected willingness to fund pilot projects.
23 This Article only compares the number of pilot projects and programs among six
states: Oregon, Pennsylvania, Florida, Texas, Arizona, and California.  In a future paper, I will
provide a comparative analysis of all fifty states to determine whether there is a stronger
connection with variables such as the geographical state regions, political party control, and
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number of examined state pilot projects during that almost two-decade
period.
STATE PILOT PROJECTS
1990’s 2009-10 Percent Change
Oregon 97 132 +36.0%
Arizona 32 28 -12.5%
Florida 124 113 -.088%
Pennsylvania 39 36 -.077%
Texas 39 128 +228%
California 88 172 +95.5%
TABLE 2
Although this is a limited sample of states’ patterns regarding the
constancy in the number of pilot projects during different decades, it is
noteworthy that there were almost no significant reductions in the per-
centage of projects, but there were significant increases in some states in
the number of pilot projects approved in 2009–2010.  The total number
of pilot projects among these seven states increased from 419 during the
1990s to 609 in 2009–2010, for a total increase of 48.8%.  That increase
was similar to the 45% increase in federal pilot projects for the same
time period.
C. Estimated Cost of Pilot Projects
There are currently no estimates regarding the annual federal and
state expenditures on pilot projects.  The cost of Federal pilot programs
obviously dwarfs expenditures by individual state pilot programs.24  As
state economic conditions.  It was not possible to conduct identical Westlaw searches for each
of the six states because some states’ electronic legislative records do not start until a few
years after 1990.  For the current study, I used the internet for the following relevant periods
for each state: (1) Oregon: 1995–1996 vs. 2009–2010, see Bills and Laws, OR. STATE LEGIS-
LATURE, https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws (last visited Nov. 15, 2015); (2) Penn-
sylvania: 1991–1992 v. 2009–2010, see Bills and Amendments, PA. GEN. ASSEMBLY,  http://
www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/legis/home/bills/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2014); (3) Florida:
1998–1999 v. 2009–2010, see Bills for Regular Session, FLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/bills.aspx (last visited Nov. 15, 2014); (4)
Texas: 1993 v. 2009, see Direct Search, LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE LIBRARY OF TEX., http://
www.lrl.state.tx.us/legis/billsearch/lrlhome.cfm (last visited Nov. 15, 2014); (5) Arizona: 1997
v. 2009, see Bill Search, ARIZ. STATE LEGISLATURE, http://www.azleg.gov/bills.asp (last vis-
ited Nov. 15, 2014); and (6) California: 1991 v. 2009, see  Bill Search, CAL. LEGISLATIVE
INFO., http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billSearchClient.xhtml (last visited Nov. 15,
2014).  Therefore, this research provides a thumbnail sketch of the quantitative changes in six
different states between substantial time periods; however, it does not provide a complete
empirical analysis of those trends.
24 For instance, the federal Medicaid pilot projects were budgeted for $437 billion, and
those pilot programs are expected to cost $32 billion more than expected.  Rich Daly, Reform
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indicated, supra Part I.A, there were 704 federal pilots in 2009–2010.
These programs’ costs ranged from tens of millions of dollars to billions
of dollars per year for projects with durations between three and five
years.25
The data, supra Part I.B., demonstrates that in 2009–2010 there
were 609 pilot projects in the six states that were analyzed, or approxi-
mately 100 pilot projects per state.  Assuming that those six states (lo-
cated on the West Coast, East Coast, and in the South) are representative
of the pilot project activity in other states throughout the country, one
could estimate that in 2009–2010, states funded approximately 5,000 pi-
lot projects and programs.  Even if one assumes a very conservative cost
of $1,000,000 per state pilot project, the estimated cost of state pilot pro-
grams is $5 billion annually.  It is thus surprising that with so many bil-
lions of dollars at stake in pilot projects, this significant and continuing
element of state and federal governmental fiscal activity has received so
little attention.26
Update: Medicaid Pilot Projects Cost $32 Billion More than Expected, GAO Says, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (July 23, 2013), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20130723/NEWS/
307239956; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICAID DEMONSTRATION WAIV-
ERS: APPROVAL PROCESS RAISES COST CONCERNS AND LACKS TRANSPARENCY (2013), availa-
ble at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/655483.pdf.
25 For instance, expenditures for pilot programs for a single federal program, called the
“Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) and Health Care and Education Recon-
ciliation Act of 2010,” included: (1) the Regionalized Systems for Emergency Care Pilots, Sec.
3504 was funded for “$24 million . . . annually for 2010–2014”; (2) the Healthy Aging, Living
Well Pilot Program, Sec. 4202 was funded for $50 million for 2010–2014; (3) the Demonstra-
tion Projects to Address Health Professions, Sec. 5507 was funded for $85 million; (4) $25
million for Childhood Obesity, Sec. 4306; (5) $60 million for Alternative Dental Care pilots;
(6) up to $100 million for Complex Diagnostic Laboratory demonstration; (7) $75 million for
Emergency Psychiatric demonstration project; (8) $50 million for Tort Litigation project; (9)
$25 million for At Home Demonstration Pilot; (10) $250 million for Nurse Education Demon-
stration Project; (11) $500 million for a Payment Adjustments For Home Health Care demon-
stration project. See CTR. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID INNOVATION, PILOT PROGRAMS AND
DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS: THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (PPACA)
AND HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATION RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010 (2010).  (12) $500 million
for pilot projects in the Water Resources Development Act of 2013, S. 601. CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE S. 601 WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 2013, at 2
(2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/s601.pdf.  For
another discussion federal medical pilot programs, see ANDREW COHEN, CTR. FOR HEALTH
LAW AND ECON., UNIV. OF MASS. MED. SCH., PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT (H.R. 3590) – PILOT PROGRAMS, DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS, AND GRANTS (2010).  This
cost estimate for pilot projects does not include the research budget for the Department of
Defense, which is budgeted for $67.5 billion in 2014 alone. See U.S. Dep’t. of Def., Fiscal
Year 2014 Budget Request (2013), available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/
budget/fy2014/sum/fy-2014-overview.pdf.
26 These cost estimates are only based on Congressional and state legislative pilot
projects and do not contain the additional expenditures for federal and state executive and
judicial pilot projects.  For example, state courts through their administrative office of the
courts fund hundreds of pilot projects annually. See, e.g., Request for Proposals Archive, CAL.
COURTS, http://www.courts.ca.gov/4834.htm#2012 (last visited Nov. 15. 2014).  I have been
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II. HIGHLY REGULATED FEDERAL PILOT PROJECTS
This Part compares Congress’s administrative controls of U.S. De-
partment of Transportation pilot projects with three state pilot projects
regarding child welfare.  This comparison will identify effective and in-
effective procedures that help to: (1) control costs; (2) assure accounta-
bility and methodological soundness; and (3) increase success rates for
pilot projects.27
A. United States Department of Transportation Pilot Projects
The U.S. Department of Transportation oversees some of the most
expensive pilot programs in the nation.  For instance, in 2011 the Federal
Transit Administration (FTA) reported to Congress that it had a total of
$43,181,353,804 in total capital costs for “New Starts and Small Starts
Projects.”28  In its 2008–2009 report to Congress, the Department stated
that $44,762,000 was appropriated, and in 2009, $45,700,000 was pro-
vided for FTA research projects.29  Those projects ranged from small
experiments, such as the Intelligent Transportation System Pilot Project
funded for $452,212 a year for two years,30 to much larger projects like
unable to locate financial literature directly discussing the relevance of project financing to
governmental pilot projects.  “Project finance involves a public or private sector sponsor in-
vesting in a single-purpose asset through a legally independent entity” and “a number of key
characteristics of project finance . . . [are] high leverage and non-recourse debt . . . .” Marco
Sorge, The Nature of Credit Risk in Project Finance, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2004, at 91, 91–92.
For a discussion of the benefits of project financing see What Is Project Finance?, EAGLE
TRADERS, https://eagletraders.com/loans/loans_what_is_project_finance.php (last visited Nov.
15, 2014); Project Finance Portal, HARVARD BUS. SCH., http://www.people.hbs.edu/besty/
projfinportal/index.htm (last updated June 23, 2010).
27 In 2010, Congress passed the Partnership Fund for Program Innovation pursuant to the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034.  The Partner-
ship Fund budgeted $37.5 million to help select and evaluate pilot projects.  Memorandum
from Jeffrey D. Zients, Deputy Director for Management, Exec. Office of the President, Office
of Mgmt. and Budget, on Pilot Projects for the Partnership Fund for Program Integrity Innova-
tion 1 (Oct. 19, 2010) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memo
randa/2011/m11-01.pdf.
28 FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT ON FUNDING RECOMMENDATIONS: FISCAL
YEAR 2011 NEW STARTS, SMALL STARTS, AND PAUL S. SARBANES TRANSIT IN PARKS PRO-
GRAM: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
PURSUANT TO 49 U.S.C. 5309(k)(1) (2009), available at http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/
NewStarts_mainText_Jan_2010.pdf. “New Starts projects are those whose sponsors are re-
questing $75 million or more in New Starts funds, or anticipating a total capital cost of $250
million or more (49 USC 5309(d)).  Small Starts projects are those whose sponsors are re-
questing less than $75 million in Small Starts funds and anticipating a total capital cost of less
than $250 million (49 USC 5309(e)).” Id. at 1.
29 FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FY 2008 AND FY 2009 FTA RE-
SEARCH PROJECTS, REPORT NO. FTA-TRI-20-2009.1, at 1 (2009) [hereinafter FTA Report].
30 Id. at 22.  This pilot project had already been funded since 2006 for a total of
$1,829,774. Id.  Other examples of smaller pilot projects in 2009 included the Pilot Marin
Headlands Shuttle in the Golden Gate National Recreation Area for $405,000 and the
$100,000 allocated for the Planning Study to Evaluate a Pilot Partnership Transit System in the
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\24-2\CJP202.txt unknown Seq: 10  4-FEB-15 13:15
300 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 24:291
the Human Services Transportation Coordination project, funded for
$1,600,000 each year for two years, and receiving $6,400,000 in funding
since 2006.31
B. Congressionally Mandated Assessments of Federal Transit
Administration Projects
In 2005 Congress passed the Safe, Accountable, Efficient Transpor-
tation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) by amending
Section 5309(l)(1) of Title 49 United States Code to require the FTA to
submit annual reports to Congress regarding its projects.  The reporting
requirements include an analysis of both the projects themselves, as well
as an analysis of the quality of the work performed by the project con-
tractors.32  How effective have the accountability requirements of
SAFETEA-LU been, and what lessons have we learned from its first six
years of implementation?
First, ironically, we have learned that it takes several years before
we can have sufficient data to analyze the effects of statutorily mandated
accountability measures.  In its first Before and After Studies report to
Congress, the FTA explained that because project data is often not avail-
able until several years after the funding is approved, and because it “can
then take several additional months for the project sponsor to synthesize
and evaluate all the information collected over the period of a project’s
development,” reports under new accountability standards will not be
available for several years after their pilot program implementation.33  In
addition, after Congress promulgates accountability measures, it takes
some time for the agency to draft and publish policy guidelines and a
notice of proposed rulemaking for implementation by the project manag-
ers and contractors.34
Guilford Courthouse National Military Park. FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT ON
FUNDING RECOMMENDATIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2012 CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND PAUL S.
SARBANES TRANSIT IN PARKS PROGRAMS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION TO
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS PURSUANT TO 49 USC 5309(K)(1), at A6–A7 (2011), http://
www.fta.dot.gov/documents/Annual_Report_main_text_FINAL_2_11_11(1).pdf.
31 FTA Report, supra note 29, at 28. R
32 Title 49 U.S.C. §5309(g)(2)(C) (2013), requires Before and After Studies of each of
the projects, and 49 U.S.C. § 5309(1)(2) (2013), requires Contractor Performance Assessment
Reports.
33 Letter from James S. Simpson, Adm’r, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Fed. Transit Admin., to
The Honorable Richard C. Shelby, Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs,
U.S. Senate (Aug. 10, 2006), available at http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/06_Before_and_
After_-_Final_Letter.pdf.
34 Id. There is also an ongoing process of promulgating and providing notice for
changes in the transparency and reporting requirements for both the federal agency and the
prospective and selected contractors.  For examples, see, e.g., Dep’t of Transp., Fed. Transit
Admin., Notice of Availability of Proposed Guidance for New Starts/Small Starts Policies and
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\24-2\CJP202.txt unknown Seq: 11  4-FEB-15 13:15
2014] THE UNEXAMINED MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR BUSINESS 301
Second, experience in implementing the accountability standards
led to substantial modifications of those standards.  The changes have
both a positive and a problematic impact.  First, implementation led to
several cost/benefit conclusions that resulted in a more nuanced regula-
tory scheme.  For instance, between 2007 and 2008, regulations were
modified according to the size of the project award so that smaller
projects required a lesser scale of economy regarding the cost and scope
of reporting rules.  In 2008 the two-category approach of classifying
projects as “New Starts” or “Small Starts” was modified to a three-tier
system by adding “Very Small Starts” projects.35  The 2008 report ex-
plained that “[a] subset of very simple and low cost transit projects,
termed “Very Small Starts” projects, will be evaluated and rated using an
even more simplified process.”36  A second modification to the assess-
ment instruments was to change from a system that gave each variable
identical weight to one that provided “comparable but not necessarily
equal weights.”37  For instance, the new system provided the following
weights: “cost effectiveness, 20 percent; land use, 20 percent; economic
development, 20 percent; mobility improvements, 20 percent; operating
efficiencies, 10 percent; and environmental benefits, 10 percent.”38  Al-
though these changes may have reduced excessive administrative costs
for smaller projects and better refined the values of assessment criteria,
those changes have made it almost impossible to conduct a longitudinal
examination of the effectiveness of the assessment instruments them-
selves or relative success and failure of different types of pilot projects
over a defined period of time because of the paucity of required reported
data.
In addition to the nuanced changes in assessment criteria, we have
learned many lessons from the individual FTA projects analyzed under
those criteria.  In this sense, the assessment mechanisms have been ex-
tremely important in shaping future assessment instruments, not just in
the FTA, but also in generalizing to other federal and state regulatory
Procedures and Request for Comments, 74 Fed. Reg. 23,776 (May 20, 2009); Final Guidance
on New Starts/Small Starts Policies and Procedures, 73 Fed. Reg. 46,352 (Aug. 8, 2008).
35 Compare FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., ANNUAL REPORT ON FUNDING RECOMMENDATIONS:
PROPOSED ALLOCATIONS OF FUNDS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007, app. at B-3–B-24 (2006), and
FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., BEFORE AND AFTER STUDIES OF NEW STARTS PROJECTS: REPORT TO
CONGRESS (2007) [hereinafter BEFORE AND AFTER STUDIES 2007], with FED. TRANSIT ADMIN.,
ANNUAL REPORT ON FUNDING RECOMMENDATIONS: PROPOSED ALLOCATIONS OF FUNDS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2008, app. at B-3–B-26 (2007), [hereinafter FY 2008 NEW STARTS] .
36 FY 2008 NEW STARTS, supra note 35, at B-5.  Very Small Starts projects require R
funding of “less than $50 million (including all project elements) and less than $3 million per
mile, exclusive of rolling stock.” FED. TRANSIT ADMIN. ANNUAL REPORT ON FUNDING REC-
OMMENDATIONS: FISCAL YEAR 2011  app. at B-5 (2010) [hereinafter FY 2011 NEW STARTS] ,
available at http://www.fta.dot.gov/12304_11092.html.
37 FY 2011 NEW STARTS, supra note 36, app. at B-3. R
38 Id.
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schemes.  For example, in the initial reports in 2007, several factors
made project evaluation extremely difficult.  First, in a report on the Utah
Transit Authority—Medical Center Extension of the TRAX Light Rail
System project, two serious flaws in the project system were noted: (1)
organizations other than the FTA created predictive models which did
not meld with FTA criteria; and (2) those involved in the project did not
retain critically important data necessary for project evaluation.39  The
“inconsistency and lack of archived data was troublesome and made an
accurate comparison [between predicted and actual ridership] over time
impossible.”40  We can generalize these findings to all pilot project as-
sessment instruments by requiring standardization of terminology and the
archiving of all specifically defined relevant data.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that judges, by building an
experiential base during several years of judging, could replace jurors in
deciding negligence issues.41  In effect, Justice Holmes argued that
judges could determine how the world operates and from that base of
knowledge could develop generalizations or customs regarding how the
world reasonably should operate.  By analogy, those in charge of assess-
ing pilot projects can develop a sense of what predictions within propos-
als are realistic or unrealistic.  The FTA report on the Tri-County
Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon project serves as an ex-
cellent example.42  Several of the predictions in the “Before” study pro-
posal were not realized.43  For instance, the predicted number of
passengers who would use the rail project was substantially greater than
the actual number of riders; the number of jobs created in the sector was
27% less than predicted; the predicted percentage of riders who would be
commuters was substantially higher than the actual ridership; the park
and ride estimates were excessive; and the actual rail speeds were much
lower than those predicted.44  Because these inaccurate predictions affect
Congress’s and the FTA’s decision regarding whether to proceed with a
39 BEFORE AND AFTER STUDIES 2007, supra note 35, at 5–8. R
40 Id. at 8.
41 See Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69–70, 48 S. Ct. 24, 25 (1927)
(deciding whether a driver had a duty to exit the car at a railroad crossing where his view of
oncoming trains was obscured to determine whether it is safe to cross the tracks—colloquially
termed the “stop, look, and listen rule”).  Justice Holmes stated that although the “question of
due care very generally is left to the jury . . . when the standard is clear it should be laid down
once for all by the Courts.” Id. at 70.  Holmes’ “stop, look, and listen” court-formed negli-
gence rule was clarified in Pokora v. Washbash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 54 S. Ct. 580 (1934), in
which the court returned to the traditional view that “questions of care [are left] to the jury to
be decided under the broad, unelaborated standard of negligence,” not as absolute standards set
by judges.  Trevino v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 916 F.2d 1230, 1235 (7th Cir. 1990).
42 See FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BEFORE AND AFTER STUDIES OF
NEW STARTS PROJECTS (2008) [hereinafter BEFORE AND AFTER STUDIES 2008].
43 See, e.g., id. at 5.
44 See id.
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pilot project, the government may require more accurate predictions or
additional assessment controls to combat unrealistic estimates.45  By in-
creasing the accuracy of proposal predictions, agencies can assure more
accurate data in deciding whether to fund pilots, thus increasing the
chance of success for selected proposals.
C. Congressionally Mandated Assessments of Federal Transit
Administration Selected Project Contractors
SAFETEA-LU amendments to 49 U.S.C. § 5309(l)(2) require the
FTA to file a “Contractor Performance Assessment Report” with Con-
gress annually.46  The purpose of the contractor estimates is to help in-
crease “the consistency and accuracy of cost and ridership estimates
made by each contractor.”47
The Contractor Performance Assessment reports identified a num-
ber of themes in the reliability of contractor project predictions.48  For
example, in comparing predicted ridership with actual ridership, the FTA
discovered the following recurring patterns: (1) ridership forecasts for
initial projects are much less accurate than for expansions of existing
45 If these types of inaccurate predictions are observed in a substantial number of pilot
projects, those involved in choosing which pilot projects to fund may require modifications to
project projections before the funding is approved, rather than learning after the fact that “ac-
tual capital costs were higher than the predicted costs, while the actual ridership was lower
than predicted ridership”—or a result that cost more and delivered much less than promised.
BEFORE AND AFTER STUDIES 2008, supra note 42, at 8.  In the Tren Urbano Heavy Rail Pro- R
ject, the Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority predicted a ridership of 114,500
that was only 26,900, and noted that the error was due to the following misconceptions: (1)
overconfidence that riders would give up automobiles for rail travel; (2) the assumed flat fare
was substantially less than the actual fare; (3) the predicted time advantages for rail travel was
lower than actual travel time; and (4) the projected population growth of 19 percent was actu-
ally only 5.4 percent. See BEFORE AND AFTER STUDIES 2008, supra note 42, at 8.  Another R
assessment found that programs receiving multiple sources of funding made it “difficult to
isolate the impacts” of the different programs.  Letter from Mary E. Peters, U.S. Sec’y of
Transp., to The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Hous., and
Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate (Nov. 2, 2007), available at http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/
5310_Report_for_Website.pdf.
46 See 49 U.S.C. § 5309(l)(2)(A) (2013).
47 Id.  Although this statute does not require contractor assessments in all pilot projects
and instead focuses on larger New Start projects, the lessons learned from these assessments
could also be applied to pilot projects.  In its first contractor assessment report to Congress, the
FTA stated that it would not conduct contractor assessments for “Very Small Starts [projects]
since such projects are expected to be pre-qualified based on meeting certain easily calculated
ridership and cost criteria and not based on an extensive analysis by contractors.” FED.
TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT REPORT 2
(2006), available at http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/06_Contractor_Performance_Assess
ment_Report.pdf.
48 See FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE AS-
SESSMENT REPORT (2007) [hereinafter 2007 REPORT], available at http://www.fta.dot.gov/docu
ments/CPAR_Final_Report_-_2007.pdf.
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projects;49 (2) downtown people-movers have poor ridership forecasts;50
(3) variations in projected and actual frequency of service directly affect
ridership predictions;51 and (4) overestimation of employment and popu-
lation trends often seriously affect ridership projections.52
These pilot project result patterns enable reviewers of new pilot pro-
ject proposals to require that estimates take into consideration variables
that consistently overestimate ridership and skew cost-benefit analyses
away from properly balancing costs with realistic estimates of social ben-
efit.  More methodologically sound proposals will produce three major
effects: (1) Congress, state legislatures, and administrative agencies will
approve fewer unrealistic proposals; (2) more resources will be available
to more accurately predict pilot project results; and (3) the percentage of
pilot projects that result in success as defined in their proposals should
increase, thus reducing economic waste.
D. An Overview of Three FTA Pilot Projects
One might expect that with the stringent, congressionally mandated
accountability requirements that most FTA pilot projects would be suc-
cessful in relation to project projections.  Because the statutory require-
ments were not promulgated until 2005, however, and because almost no
pilot projects were finalized until 2011, it is still too early to determine
the effectiveness of those administrative controls.  In addition, because
pilot projects are merely experiments by definition, the predicted success
rate is likely to be much lower than for expansion or extension of ex-
isting successful programs.53  The following three FTA pilot projects
demonstrate some of the assumptions and predictions that have resulted
in project failure.  These three pilot project examples range from one that
required almost no reliability standards, no assessment or measurements
of success, and no formal reporting mechanism to a project that was well
defined by data-based outcome measures.
1. Debt Service Reserve Pilot Program
What if the FTA created a debt service pilot project, but no one
applied for the debt service?  “The Debt Service Reserve Pilot Program
(DSRPP) seeks to provide credit support and reduce overall project ex-
penses by providing public transportation project sponsors that plan to
issue bonds in the capital markets with the additional flexibility to use
49 See id. app. at 39.
50 Id.
51 See id. at 41.
52 See id. at 110.
53 See, e.g., id.  app. at 39.
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federal grants to establish and maintain a debt service reserve fund.”54
Not one transit agency applied for the program because the user projec-
tions and the attractiveness of the financial instruments were based upon
four oversights: (1) there are very few potential applicants because only
transit agencies that issue debt would be interested; (2) there are existing
competitive programs; (3) the financial product is not perceived as a sig-
nificant benefit over other alternatives; and (4) there is competition with
broker commissions.55
The DSRPP is an example of a pilot project that should have failed
the “smell test” because the flaws in the projections should have been
obvious to those with expertise in market and financial instruments.  It is
unlikely that Congressional assessment and accountability mandates
would correct this type of mistake, which appears to be a product of
failing to have appropriate experts review the underlying suppositions of
the pilot concept, rather than isolating consistently unreliable predictabil-
ity criteria.  But had the project proposal been required to explicitly artic-
ulate outcome measures, methods and standards of assessment, and
report requirements, the project might have been either rejected or
amended prior to implementation.
2. Cooperative Procurement Pilot Program
The Cooperative Procurement Pilot Program involves an example of
a program with low to moderate accountability, assessment, and report-
ing requirements.  “Section 166 of the Transportation, Treasury, and In-
dependent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2004 directed the FTA to
establish the Cooperative Procurement Pilot Program (CPPP) to deter-
mine the benefits of encouraging cooperative procurement of major capi-
tal equipment.”56  The CPPP is an excellent example of a modestly
structured pilot program with limited methodologically sound accounta-
bility measures that failed to deliver expected results.  Success or failure,
however, should not be the litmus test for pilot projects where one of the
primary goals of these experiments is to determine feasibility of new
ideas and procedures, not to assure implementation.  As long as the pro-
ject produces a clear analysis of the variables that interfered with the
predicted results, the study can be useful in helping to predict future pilot
54 Letter from Mary E. Peters, U.S. Sec’y of Transp., to The Honorable James L. Ober-
star, U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, at 1 (Sept. 22,
2008), available at http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/Debt_Service_Reserve_Pilot_Program
__-Final_for_Web.pdf (discussing the DSRPP and 49 U.S.C. § 5323(d)).
55 Id. at 2.
56 FED. TRANSP. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE RE-
SULTS OF THE COOPERATIVE PROCUREMENT PILOT PROGRAM 1 (2010). See generally Consoli-
dated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–199, § 166, 118 Stat. 309.
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projects that may be more successful after implementing those
modifications.
The enabling legislation for the CPPP included the following re-
quired assessment and accountability measures: (1) cooperative develop-
ment of specifications;57 (2) joint procurement proposals that may
include multiple agencies; (3) proportionality of agency procurement ex-
penses; (4) technical outreach assistance by the Secretary of the FTA;
and (5) a report that must include the savings realized and the benefits
discovered from the implementation of cooperative procurement.58
The pilot project created five consortia of transportation authorities
in different states, with a goal of determining whether they could reduce
the cost of purchasing new buses if they pooled their purchases—much
like consumers attempting to gain a fleet discount.59  The results demon-
strated that cooperative procurement of buses by transit authorities
neither produced savings in purchases nor provided any meaningful ben-
efits.  “Only three pilot projects successfully completed bus purchases,
and the results for these pilots were mixed.”60  The experiment of provid-
ing more federal financing for bus purchases proved inadequate to incen-
tivize city transit authorities to use cooperative procurement, and
interviews with bus manufacturers revealed that cooperative procurement
does not realize savings because each city transit authority requires dif-
ferent bus characteristics, thus eliminating scales of economy through
standardization.61  The report does not specify why these weaknesses
were not reasonably knowable prior to pilot project implementation, but
this new information can be factored into cost-benefit analyses to deter-
mine whether or not to fund analogous pilot studies.
57 One of the most successful federal transportation pilot programs, the Nonmotorized
Transportation Pilot Program provided $100 million to four cities to study methods of increas-
ing bicycle usage. See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REPORT TO THE U.S.
CONGRESS ON THE OUTCOMES OF THE NONMOTORIZED TRANSPORTATION PILOT PROGRAM
SAFETEA-LU SECTION 1807, at 1 (2012).  In order to assure comparability of research meth-
odology among the four research sites, the pilot program “created a Working Group (WG)
composed of representatives from the administrating agencies in each of the communities . . .
[which] held regular teleconferences and annual meetings to discuss progress and challenges
and coordinate efforts across the pilot communities.” Id. at 3.  Creating the WG helped “re-
solve technical issues and implement a common methodology for data collection and analy-
sis.” Id. at 6.  “The key successes of the WG have been to develop a collaborative approach to
data collection and evaluation, to maintain a coordinated national program, to establish consis-
tent and credible reporting of results, and to share the progress of the Pilot Program to multiple
audiences throughout the years of its existence.” Id. at 7.
58 See FED. TRANSP. ADMIN., supra note 56, at 2–3. R
59 See id. at 4.
60 See id. at 27 (“Only three pilot projects successfully completed bus purchases, and the
results for these pilots were mixed.”).
61 See id. at 27–28.
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3. The Remote Infrared Audible Signage Pilot Program
“RIAS [Remote Infrared Audible Signage] technology is a remote
infrared communication system designed to eliminate barriers to accessi-
bility for people who are blind, visually impaired, or cognitively or de-
velopmentally disabled by assisting them with both orientation and
mobility (O & M).”62  After a competitive proposal process, the FTA
selected the Central Puget Sound Regional Transportation Authority for
the pilot project of installing RIAS technology.63  The total budget was
$2.283 million to install 303 transmitters in six transit stations.64
The legislation creating the pilot project listed four specific required
assessments: (1) the effect of the pilot program on accessibility of the
public transit system; (2) the effect of the program on public transporta-
tion operators and passengers; (3) the effect public transit has on people
with visual, cognitive, and learning disabilities; and (4) the effect of the
program on the quality of life of the target population.65  Unlike the first
two pilot projects discussed,66 the RIAS pilot project involved a multi-
faceted methodological assessment plan that included: (1) surveys, (2)
focus groups, and (3) qualitative interviews.67  This inclusive, method-
ological fact-investigation permitted the evaluation of both quantitative
and qualitative results and made the decision of whether to expand the
pilot into a full program much more accurate and nuanced.68
The pilot data demonstrated that the RIAS system, through its meth-
odological assessment plan, increased transit accessibility for the target
population, and increased users’ confidence and efficiency in using the
system.69 The interviews discovered, however, that some of the place-
ments of the RIAS transmitters were much less meaningful than others,
and that too few were placed in strategic locations, especially in ways
62 MARGARET PETRELLA ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REMOTE INFRARED AUDIBLE
SIGNAGE PILOT PROGRAM: EVALUATION REPORT 1 (2009).
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Letter from Mary E. Peters to The Honorable James L. Oberstar, supra note 54; FED. R
TRANSP. ADMIN., supra note 56. R
67 PETRELLA ET AL., supra note 62, at 2. R
68 See id. at 2–3.
69 Id. at 2.  “[A]necdotal evidence can ‘vividly complement’ statistical evidence of dis-
crimination.”  Jeffrey M. Hanson, Hanging by Yarns?: Deficiencies in Anecdotal Evidence
Threaten the Survival of Race-Based Preference Programs for Public Contracting, 88 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1433, 1448 (2003) (quoting Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City of Denver, 36
F.3d 1513, 1520 (10th Cir.1994)).  “Convincing statistical and anecdotal evidence can make
for a ‘potent’ combination, because anecdotal evidence can bring ‘cold numbers convincingly
to life.’” Id. (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977);
Coral Constr. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 1991)). See also Dawn Fresh-
water et al., Qualitative Research as Evidence: Criteria for Rigour and Relevance, 15 J. OF
RES. NURSING 497, 498 (2010).
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that provided sufficient information about approaching buses.70  Yet be-
cause of the pilot study’s short duration, the data regarding projections
about the effect of the RIAS system on ridership provided insufficient
evidence to permit an accurate prediction on the effects of an expanded
system.71  Based upon the pilot project data, the report recommended: (1)
a continuation of the pilot project in order to obtain longitudinal data; (2)
further analysis by a group of experts to determine whether or not other
technology might be better than the RIAS system in helping the target
population with their transportation needs and confidence; and (3) an ex-
panded publication of the pilot project information so that more users
might participate in the pilot project.72
The RIAS pilot project encapsulates most of the important variables
necessary for designing a pilot project that will yield sufficient depth and
breadth of data from which a reasoned decision about whether to expand
the pilot to a full project can be made.73  However, the RIAS pilot in-
volved an experiment in which much of the data to be discovered was
objective––whether the transponders worked and provided better access
to the transit for the target audience, or whether there were a sufficient
number of transponders and if they were strategically placed—and only a
few questions concerned subjective qualitative criteria, such as riders’
satisfaction with the system or the effect on riders’ confidence in using
the transit system.74  Even so, the methodology and assessment instru-
ments used in the RIAS pilot project comprise some of the most sophisti-
cated analytical variables that offer benefits for future project
accountability standards.
III. STATE LEGISLATIVE PILOT PROJECTS: POORLY REGULATED
AND NON-STANDARDIZED
Unlike the congressionally required assessment and accountability
standards in federal pilot projects, such standards are rarely mandated in
state pilot projects.  This Part compares two state pilot projects that were
designed to determine whether previously confidential child dependency,
child abuse, and neglect court hearings should be opened to the press and
public.  As will be demonstrated, pilot projects that begin with a substan-
tial disagreement between constituents and users regarding the social
utility of the desired pilot project need to be designed somewhat differ-
ently than pilots that are less concerned with political and human rights
70 PETRELLA ET AL., supra note 62, at 2. R
71 Id. at 3.
72 See id. at 29–31.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 27–28.
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issues, since anecdotal and subjective opinions might overwhelm data-
based outcome measurements.
The debate over whether civil child dependency courts that litigate
whether children have been abused should be presumptively open to the
press and public has been vibrant for several decades.  Historically, de-
pendency court proceedings were confidential in a supermajority of
states.75  In the late 1990s, however, the debate shifted from one almost
exclusively based on politics, ad hoc personal observations, and specula-
tion to a debate based on system accountability.  The debate began to
shift after the Minnesota Supreme Court published its “empirical” study
of its Open Court Pilot Project.76  Although the Minnesota pilot project,
which was researched and written by the National Center for State
Courts (NCSC), found that opening the courts had little impact on im-
proving the public’s knowledge of dependency courts and that the pre-
dicted systemic improvements did not materialize, the result that drew
the most attention was that opening the proceedings to the press and pub-
lic did not place abused children at further risk of being psychologically
harmed from the publicity.77  The NCSC pilot project report had a cas-
cading effect on the open/closed court debate.  First, the largest organiza-
tion of juvenile court judges in the United States, the National Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges, issued a policy statement supporting
the opening of child dependency courts to the press and public.78  Sec-
ond, as the claims of potential psychological harm to children lost vitality
in the face of the Minnesota pilot results, states such as California and
Connecticut proposed open court legislation.79  Third, writers relied on
75 I have been researching and writing on the topic of open versus confidential juvenile
dependency cases for approximately fifteen years.  For background data on this debate, and for
extensive discussions about the Minnesota and Connecticut Pilot Projects, see William W.
Patton, Pandora’s Box: Opening Child Protection Cases to the Press and Public, 27 W. ST. U.
L. REV. 181 (1999); William W. Patton, Revictimizing Child Abuse Victims: An Empirical
Rebuttal to the Open Juvenile Dependency Court Reform Movement, SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 303
(2005) [hereinafter Patton, Revictimizing Child Abuse Victims]; William W. Patton, When the
Empirical Base Crumbles: The Myth that Open Dependency Proceedings Do Not Psychologi-
cally Damage Abused Children, 33 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 29 (2009) [hereinafter Patton,
When the Empirical Base Crumbles]; William W. Patton, The Connecticut Open-Court Move-
ment: Reflection and Remonstration, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 8 (2005).
76 MINN. SUP. CT. ADVISORY COMM., INTRODUCTION TO FINAL REPORT OF NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS (Vol. 1, 2001) [hereinafter NCSC REPORT V. 1]. See also FRED L.
CHEESMAN, II, KEY FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION OF OPEN HEARINGS AND COURT
RECORDS IN JUVENILE PROTECTION MATTERS (Vol. 2, 2001) [hereinafter NCSC REPORT V. 2].
77 NCSC REPORT V. 2, supra note 76, at 16, 32. R
78 NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RESOL. NO. 9, IN SUPPORT
OF PRESUMPTIVELY OPEN HEARINGS WITH DISCRETION OF COURTS TO CLOSE (2005), available
at http://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/default/files/resolution%2520no.%25209%2520open%2520hear
ings.pdf.
79 The California Legislature debated three successive open court measures; however,
none of them received the necessary political support and/or votes to pass. See, e.g., S.B.
1391, 1999-2000 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000).  In Connecticut, two open court bills failed to pass,
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the results as gospel for the conclusion that open courts do not harm
abused children.80  And finally, the Arizona Legislature commissioned
its own open pilot project study that was modeled upon the methodology
of the Minnesota pilot study.81
But the inevitable occurred.  The methodology, assessment instru-
ments, and results of the Minnesota pilot project were subjected to seri-
ous scholarly attack, and the person in charge of that pilot project report
admitted the report’s methodological flaws while testifying under oath in
a juvenile court.82  First, it became evident that the NCSC had been for-
bidden from interviewing the children and parents who were appearing in
the child dependency proceedings because those interviews might harm
the abused children.83  The irony of the Pilot Advisory Committee per-
mitting abused children to undergo in-court examination before strangers
and the press, but not permitting questioning in a much less threatening
environment by the NCSC staff, impeached the pilot’s findings that chil-
dren are not harmed by merely discussing their abuse or neglect with
researchers in a controlled and safe environment.  In addition, the failure
to interview those in the best position to know how the open court pro-
cess affected the abused children—the children themselves and their par-
ents—demonstrated the speculative nature of the conclusion regarding
the children’s safety in open courts.  But the methodological flaws ran
deeper.  The assessment instruments were not designed to even register
examples or evidence of harm to the abused children.  Rather, the instru-
ments only measured “extraordinary harm,” a term that was never de-
fined in the report and which was not defined for those who completed
the pilot project surveys.84  Another major methodological flaw was that
the study did not take into consideration the psychological and psychiat-
and a third bill created a pilot project to be discussed. See infra note 90 and accompanying R
text.
80 See Barbara W. Stack, The Dangers of Identifying Children, THE QUILL, Sept. 2002, at
32; Barbara White Stack, Edited Transcript of Comments, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 24, 25
(2004); Kathleen Blatz, Transcript of Remarks, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 24, 29 (2004); Sara
VanMeter, Public Access to Juvenile Dependency Proceedings in Washington State: An Im-
portant Piece of the Permanency Puzzle, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 859, 879 (2004); CHRISTINA
D. GHIO, TESTIMONY OF THE CENTER FOR CHILDREN’S ADVOCACY IN SUPPORT OF RAISED
BILL NO. 555: AN ACT CONCERNING JUVENILE COURTS (2004); DIONNE MAXWELL ET AL.,
NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, TO OPEN OR NOT TO OPEN: THE
ISSUE OF PUBLIC ACCESS IN CHILD PROTECTION HEARINGS (2004).
81 GREGORY B. BROBERG, ARIZONA OPEN DEPENDENCY HEARING PILOT STUDY (2006).
82 See Patton, Revictimizing Child Abuse Victims, supra note 75, at 309–16; Patton, R
When the Empirical Base Crumbles, supra note 75, at 30; Transcript of Proceedings, In re San R
Mateo County Human Services Agency (2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Transcript].
83 Transcript, supra note 82, at 16. R
84 Id. at 34, 45–46.  When asked on the witness stand to define the term “extraordinary”
harm, Dr. Cheesman stated not only that he chose that standard, but also that he guessed that it
meant a case in which “you’re able to demonstrate embarrassment or psychological trauma.”
Id. at 45–46.
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ric evidence that trauma to the abused children from public disclosure,
embarrassment, guilt, and shame might not manifest for weeks or months
after the open court hearing, and that longitudinal surveys would be re-
quired to validate a conclusion that open hearings do not harm abused
children.85  Finally, the NCSC pilot study did not even survey the mental
health experts in the child dependency system regarding whether or not
the open hearings could or did harm the abused child victims.86  Based
upon the methodological weakness in the Minnesota pilot project report,
the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges issued a report
that concluded:
The NCSC report and its findings are now widely refer-
enced by proponents for open hearings as supporting the
view that open hearings do not produce the negative ef-
fects that have been argued for by opponents to this
practice . . . .  [A] number of methodological and other
design flaws have been identified in the study by other
researchers in this area that may further limit the scope
and applicability of these findings to other
jurisdictions.87
Unlike the Congressionally defined assessments of FTA pilot
projects, there were no statutorily-mandated assessment or methodologi-
cal standards imposed on the Open Court Pilot Project.  Had such con-
trols been implemented in the design and approval of the study, the
methodological flaws and resulting impeachment of the study may have
been eliminated.  In addition, the flawed conclusion that open hearings
do not harm abused children would not have solidified from opinion to
supposed empirical truth, and some of the open court legislation from
after the Minnesota pilot study might have resulted in a greater percent-
age of failure, or a closer inspection of the issue of harm to abused chil-
dren, and mandatory prophylactic protections for children might have
been implemented.88
85 Patton, Revictimizing Child Abuse Victims, supra note 75, at 312–15. R
86 Transcript, supra note 84, at 44. R
87 DIONNE MAXWELL ET AL., supra note 80, at 12–14, 15 n.26 (2004). R
88 For a discussion of the difficulties of designing an accurate pilot project assessment
tool for programs that involve multiple samples, see the discussion of the assessment of the
Florida coordinated school health pilot project, that identified the following assessment
problems: (1) the start of a pilot project before the finalization of the assessment instruments;
(2) the failure to establish uniform goals and assessment criteria among multiple sites; (3) the
problems inherent in setting assessment goals where no prior baseline data has been accumu-
lated for comparison; and (4) the lack of pairings between comparison and control groups.
Robert M. Weiler et al., Evaluation of the Florida Coordinated School Health Program Pilot
Schools Project, 73 J. SCH. HEALTH 3, 4 (2003).
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Once the Minnesota report was impeached, however, more method-
ologically-sound instruments and assessments were soon developed for
future state open court pilot projects.89  The best example is Connecti-
cut’s Juvenile Access Pilot Program.90  Whether to open the dependency
courts in Connecticut was an extremely contentious political issue, and
two earlier bills to open the courts were defeated prior to the 2009 legis-
lation.91  The political debate was even more problematic since those on
both sides of the issue worked together on a daily basis in the depen-
dency courts: (1) the attorneys representing the Department of Child and
Family Services; (2) parents’ lawyers; (3) children’s lawyers, guardians
ad litem, and child and adolescent psychologists and psychiatrists; and
(4) judges.  Thus, any open pilot project in Connecticut would not only
have to cure the methodological flaws inherent in the Minnesota study,
but also assure the disparate contingencies that they would have an equal
role in the investigation and analysis of the study results to create suffi-
cient credibility to support expanding the open court system beyond the
pilot project.  The legislative response was to form a Juvenile Access
Pilot Program Advisory Board, which not only included representation of
the broad scope of professionals working in and with the courts in depen-
dency cases, but it also provided a seat for both proponents and oppo-
nents of opening the courts.92
The Connecticut pilot study mandated both quantitative and qualita-
tive examination of the open court pilot project.  For instance, the quanti-
89 One of the problems with some court pilot projects is that they approve a courtroom
experiment before agreeing to the methodological techniques and outcome measures.  For in-
stance, after years of judicial debate, in September 2010 “the Judicial Conference authorized a
three-year pilot project to evaluate the effect of cameras in district court courtrooms, video
recordings of proceedings therein, and publication of such video recordings by making them
available” through court websites.  Press Release, United States Courts, Judicial Conference
Comm. on Court Admin. and Case Management, Guidelines for the Cameras Pilot Project in
the District Courts 1, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2011/docs/Cameras
Guidelines.pdf.  However, the Conference directed another committee to “conduct a study of
the pilot” and to “prepare interim reports after the first and second years of the pilot.” Id.
Starting pilot programs in several different locations without first establishing a unified meth-
odology and consistent outcome measures decreases the chances that valid conclusions can be
generated out of the cumulative data.
90 H.B. 6419, 2009 Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2009).
91 See H.B. 5555, Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2004) (“An Act Concerning Public Access to Pro-
ceedings in Certain Juvenile Matters”); H.B. 5219, Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2005) (“An Act Con-
cerning the Hearing of Juvenile Matters”).
92 The advisory board included the Chief Court Administrator (a proponent), a center for
child advocacy proponent, as well as attorneys from Connecticut Legal Services, the Division
of Criminal Justice, the Bureau of Child Welfare Services, the Office of the Child Advocate,
Office of the Chief Child Protection Agency, Office of the Chief Public Defender, Office of
the Attorney General, a social worker representative for the Department of Child & Family
Services, and a representative from the media. Juvenile Access Pilot Program Advisory
Board, STATE OF CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH, http://www.jud.ct.gov/Committees/
juv_access/default.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2014).
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tative data included the number of hearings closed to protect the best
interests of children and the number and success of motions by attorneys
to close the presumptively open hearings.93  Although the Connecticut
qualitative interviews included comments from the same system profes-
sionals included in the Minnesota report, the Connecticut pilot study also
surveyed abused children’s parents and mental health experts regarding
their attitudes toward opening the courts to the press and public.94  Al-
though the Advisory Board was co-chaired by two professionals who
favored opening the courts at the beginning of the pilot study, when the
Board reviewed all of the Pilot Project’s empirical data, it recommended
presumptively closing all of the juvenile dependency courts to the press
and public because “significant concerns remained . . . that opening child
protection proceedings could potentially harm children.”95  Unlike the
Minnesota Pilot Project report, there have so far been no published at-
tacks on the methodological and assessment validity of the Connecticut
study.
Unlike the statutorily mandated outcome measures required under
federal law, most state pilot projects share one or more of the following
characteristics: (1) no mandatory general statutory data-based outcome
measures; (2) an ad hoc or sui generis research design for each specific
pilot project; and (3) very few objective outcome measures defined
before implementation, so that determining success, failure, or the desira-
bility of expanding the pilot project state-wide is usually more politically
than empirically based.96
93 See JUVENILE ACCESS PILOT PROGRAM ADVISORY BD., REPORT TO THE CONNECTICUT
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 20–21, 25 (2010).
94 Id. at 22.
95 Id. at 15, 30.
96 One might think that comparing accountability measures in federal transportation pilot
projects with state accountability controls in child abuse pilot projects is inappropriate since
testing transportation effects are much easier than determining the effects of changes in child
abuse prevention and treatment results.  However, federal outcome measure and compliance
standards are equally rigorous for transportation projects and for federally supported child
abuse prevention and treatment programs. See Social Security Act, Title IV-E § 422, 42
U.S.C. § 622 (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 205.50(a)(1)(i), (a)(2)(ii) (2014); 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 5106a(b)(2)(B)(viii) (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FEDERAL CHILD
AND FAMILY SERVICES REVIEWS: AGGREGATE REPORT, ROUND 2, FISCAL YEARS 2007–2010,
at 1 (2011), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/fcfsr_report.pdf.  For an
extensive analysis of federal accountability standards for federally supported state child abuse
programs funded under the CAPTA and the Social Security Act, see William Wesley Patton,
Bringing Facts Into Fiction: The First “Data-Based” Accountability Analysis of the Differ-
ences Between Presumptively Open and Closed Child Dependency Systems, 44 U. MEM. L.
REV. 831 (2014).
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CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED
It is important to properly define “success” and “failure” for pilot
projects.  Sufficiently defining success enables evaluators to both
“[u]nderstand why actual organizational conduct differs from official
policy” and to better recommend “implementation strategies for change,”
and provides a more accurate determination for whether the pilot project
should be expanded or made a permanent program.97  Obviously, a meth-
odologically sound, unbiased98 report that produces a roadmap for suc-
cessfully replicating the pilot project on a larger scale is a success under
any definition.99  But, we must not lose sight of the nature of pilot
97 Mary E. Poulin et al., The Significance of Definitions of Success in Program Evalua-
tion, 24 EVALUATION REV. 516, 516–18 (2000).  Heterogeneity among multiple pilot projects
can substantially decrease the chances of successfully expanding to full scale programs.
“[W]ell-matched comparison groups offer the best chance for identifying the effects of any
particular intervention.” CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ISSUE BRIEF: LESSONS FROM MEDICARE’S
DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS ON DISEASE MANAGEMENT, CARE COORDINATION, AND VALUE-
BASED PAYMENT 7–8 (2012).
98 Project evaluations must avoid the potential for bias through a too limited or selective
evaluation population.  “It is essential to gain a comprehensive understanding of the motiva-
tions, constraints, and considerations of all parties involved in the program (policy makers,
program operators, and the target population).”  Yonatan Eyal, Examination of the Empirical
Research Environment of Program Evaluation: Methodology and Application, 34 EVALUA-
TION REV. 455, 476 (2010).  The term “trapped administrators” describes those involved in the
analysis of pilot projects who “have so committed themselves in advance to the efficacy of the
reform that they cannot afford honest evaluation.”  Judith Clark Turner & William J. TenHoor,
The Nimh Community Support Program: Pilot Approach to a Needed Social Reform, 4 SCHIZ-
OPHRENIA BULL. 319, 341 (1978).  Turner and TenHoor identified the following common
weaknesses in project reports: (1) inadequate definition of service system goals; (2) fragmenta-
tion and confusion of responsibility among participants and agencies; and (3) lack of a sys-
temic approach to financing community-based services. Id. at 322–25.
99 Drawing generalizations about pilot projects is difficult because there is a bias in the
publication of pilot studies.  “Publication bias may occur because of a tendency for journals to
accept only papers that have statistically significant results and not to report non-significant
effects . . . .”  van Teijlingen & Hundley, supra note 2.  Pilot studies also involve Type III R
errors: the failure to adequately and frequently assess target populations implementation of
pilot goals.  “Two frequently overlooked issues in implementation involve documenting the
rate and intensity of participation of the target population, and monitoring alternative programs
delivered to control or comparison groups.”  Joseph A. Durlak, Why Program Implementation
Is Important, 17 J. PREVENTION & INTERVENTION COMMUNITY 5, 13 (1998).  Differing levels
of participation may involve logistical problems, differing levels of participation stress, and
differences among participants’ abilities to access and use program materials which can be
analyzed using “[f]idelity reports [that] show that all leaders were able to cover the material
and differences in group composition.”  Tali Raviv & Martha E. Wadsworth, The Efficacy of a
Pilot Prevention Program for Children and Caregivers Coping with Economic Strain, 34 COG-
NITIVE THERAPY RES. 216, 225 (2010).  The failure to adequately account for participation
rates and “drop out” participants can seriously bias pilot project results.
For example, if persons with better future prospects were more likely not to bother
showing up for the program, participants would overrepresent persons with less
favorable prospects.  Thus the control group outcome would overestimate the out-
come for participants in the absence of the program, and the difference between the
observed participant and control group outcomes would underestimate the effect of
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projects—they are experiments, and even if they fail they can success-
fully provide data on how to redesign projects, or evidence of why a
larger scale project should not be pursued.100  Even if the pilot project
appears to be initially successful, however, if the methodology and as-
sessment tools present an inaccurate and/or biased report, expansion be-
yond the pilot project may ultimately prove to be a costly mistake:
[W]here a pilot study requires a significant investment of
resources, making it difficult for the study team to call a
halt to the research after an unsuccessful pilot study . . .
[they] might be tempted to make considerable changes in
the main study, rather than deciding that the proposed
study is not possible with the available resources, time,
population, etc.101
the program.  The reverse would occur if persons with less favorable prospects (per-
haps because of weak motivation) were most likely not to show up for the program.
Howard S. Bloom, Accounting for No-Shows in Experimental Evaluation Designs, 8 EVALUA-
TION REV. 225, 226 (1984).  Assessment design must account for the effects of subject selec-
tion.  For instance, in studies involving children, a shift from passive parental consent
(students become study subjects unless parents object) to active parental consent (students
cannot participate without active, and often written, parental consent) can result in: (1) a biased
sample substantially underrepresenting minority children; (2) reduced response rates; and (3) a
lower incidence of antisocial behavior among the test group.  Mathew W. Courser et al., The
Impact of Active Consent Procedures on Nonresponse and Nonresponse Error in Youth Survey
Data: Evidence from a New Experiment, 33 EVALUATION REV. 370, 371–75 (2009).  For an
interesting solution to the problem of designing a study when “random allocation is not possi-
ble” between control and reference groups, see Jose E. Urquieta-Salomo´n et al., Poverty and
Gender Perspective in Productive Projects for Rural Women in Mexico: Impact Evaluation of
a Pilot Project, 33 EVALUATION REV. 27, 31 (2009).
100 The most vital pilot project reviews include evaluative and summative, or “sunset,”
review.  To be successful, sunset review, which requires justification of the continuation of a
program, “should be accompanied by realistic information requirements that are tailored to
specific program types and by early and detailed guidance concerning the designs and methods
that will produce the desired information.”  Linda Berry, Providing Guidance for Program
Evaluations: Sunset Reviews Versus Evaluation Plans, 10 EVALUATION REV. 757, 772 (1986).
The quality of evaluative reviews is increased by “reviewing evaluations of similar programs,
by consulting with program managers, and by defining the tasks required to achieve the de-
sired results.” Id. at 758.
101 van Teijlingen & Hundley, supra note 2.  Program evaluators are not immune from R
temptations toward unethical conduct.  In one study, “over two thirds (68%) of those who had
done external evaluations exclusively said that they had faced ethical conflicts, whereas less
than half (49%) of those who had conducted only internal evaluations reported any ethical
challenges.”  Michael Morris & Robin Cohn, Program Evaluators and Ethical Challenges: A
National Survey, 17 EVALUATION REV. 621, 636 (1993).  Over 59% of evaluators listed pres-
sure applied on evaluators regarding the presentation of the project findings as the most com-
mon ethical conflict they face. Id.  The ethical conflicts strike at the heart of the program
examiners’ role to “seek the truth and communicate it . . . evaluators frequently feel pressured
to compromise their role as scientists.” Id. at 639.  The process of defining goals and assess-
ment instruments during the formative phase is a deeply political process in which different
constituencies attempt to realize their often conflicting goals. See Judy L. Fitzpatrick, Roles of
the Evaluator in Innovative Programs: A Formative Evaluation, 12 EVALUATION REV. 449,
449, 452, 458 (1988).
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The definition of pilot project “success” must, therefore, include the
quality and reliability of the data generated by the pilot project, not just
the conclusion that the experiment produced positive results.102
In order to produce valid comparative and longitudinal assessments,
pilot projects need to provide: (1) consistency of terminology and assess-
ment instruments;103 (2) baseline definitions;104 (3) realistic budgetary
102 Drafting unambiguous pilot project performance measures is essential in reducing
contract litigation. See, e.g., OTI Am. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 108, 112 (2005) (discuss-
ing a conflict surrounding the Government Printing Office [GPO] pilot program that created a
four-stage head-to-head competition among companies to design a new passport.  The GPO
alleged that OTI America failed to “meet the contract requirements” and OTI sued for breach
of contract under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §1491(b) (2012), arguing that the conditions that
led to an inferior product had been out of its control and were corrected).  See also Wilco Floor
Serv., Inc. v. United States, 197 Ct. Cl. 902, 903 (1972) (holding that failure to pay costs for
the first six weeks on the initial pilot project phase constituted a breach of contract); Phoenix C
& D Recycling v. Des Moines Metro. Area Solid Waste Agency, No. 0-235/09-0712, 2010
Iowa App. LEXIS 508, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 26, 2010) (addressing a dispute over the
costs of waste cleanup in a pilot project based upon agency determination that contractor “did
not meet minimum standards set by MWA”); Sargent v. Block, 576 F. Supp. 882, 882 (D.D.C.
1983) (addressing a dispute over the legality of the pilot program verification procedures).  For
cases involving pilot project statutory and constitutional violations, see In re D.W., 155 P.3d
682, 682–83 (Haw. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that the Family Court pilot program providing
parents in child abuse cases with guardians ad litem rather than attorneys did not violate due
process); Smith v. L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 700 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002) (holding that the county’s Home Call Visitation Pilot Project which required home visits
as a condition for receiving welfare benefits did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Int’l Bhd.
of Teamsters v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 724 F.3d 206, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (holding that the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration pilot project to permit Mexico-domiciled truck-
ing companies to operate in the United States did not violate federal law).
103 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PARTNERSHIPS IN CHARACTER EDUCATION: STATE PI-
LOT PROJECTS, 1995–2001 LESSONS LEARNED 7 (2008), available at http://www2.ed.gov/pro-
grams/charactered/lessons.pdf (arguing that the federally-funded state character education pilot
projects completed between 1991 and 2006 could not be effectively compared because “[t]he
assessment process was different from state to state because no uniform assessment model was
available”).  Although standardized assessment tools provide for reliable comparisons among
pilots, standardization may lead to less effective pilot programs in which “cookie-cutter” ap-
proaches may not meet local or regional needs. See id. at 15 (arguing that some states, such as
Vermont and California, found a need to design different assessment methods because “each
program was unique to its specific school environment,” but, due to the lack of standardization
programs, “could not be assessed adequately across these different environments, which made
it difficult to draw quantitative conclusions”).  In addition, researchers cannot just intuitively
generalize program models among different subject populations. See, e.g., Jodi Lane & Lonn
Lanza-Kaduce, Before You Open the Doors: Ten Lessons from Florida’s Faith and Commu-
nity-Based Delinquency Treatment Initiative, 31 EVALUATION REV. 121, 145 (2007) (finding
that the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) Florida pilot project to
design and implement a faith and community based program for incarcerated juveniles be-
tween the ages of thirteen to seventeen simply did not work for children six to eleven years old
because it did not account for the difference among family members’ participation rates and
scheduling difficulties when younger children were studied).
104 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 103, at 8 (finding that “[i]n some cases, schools R
lacked baseline data to make comparisons and, thus, measure improvement.”). See also Jo-
hanna D. Birckmayer & Carol Hirschon Weiss, Theory-Based Evaluation in Practice: What
Do We Learn?, 24 EVALUATION REV. 407, 408 (finding that theory based evaluation requires a
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costs;105 (4) defined outcome measures and explicit definitions and mea-
sures of success;106 and (5) the focus and freedom to critically assess
whether the pilot program needs modification, whether the pilot experi-
ment should be expanded into a permanent program, or whether the pilot
program should end without expansion.107  These accountability controls
determination of “what activities are being conducted, what effect each particular activity will
have, what the program does next, what the expected response is, what happens next” until the
expected outcomes are analyzed); id. at 408 (stating that “[a]n evaluation that investigates the
theories underlying . . . [a] program . . . seeks to find out whether the theories on which the
program is based are realized in action”); id. at 429 (finding that the quality of project evalua-
tions will be increased if the project theory is well-defined, the project reflects “the assump-
tions embedded in the theory,” and there is sufficient time and resources to properly evaluate
the pilot study);  id. at 426 (discussing whether the theoretical assumptions underlying pilot
projects need to be made explicit since implicit assumptions will require the evaluator to con-
struct assessment variables).
105 Since one of the salient issues inherent in pilot projects is to determine feasibility of
extending the limited pilot in size and duration, the pilot must determine realistic costs for
providing the promised services and/or pilot goals. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note
103, at 8 (determining that in the federal character education, state pilots many could not be R
sustained without continuing federal budgetary support, and “[a]lthough the Pilot Project
grants funded activities for up to five years, sustaining any significant education program
thereafter required new or reallocated funding”).  In order to help sustain the state programs
funding had to be increased by almost 300%. Id. at 10.  Some of the educational pilot pro-
grams lacked money to sustain and expand the pilots. Id. at 19.  Other pilot project studies do
not even mention the cost of the pilot or project the costs of expansion. See, e.g., JUDY
CASHMORE & LILY TRIMBOLI, NSW BUREAU OF CRIME STATISTICS AND RES., AN EVALUATION
OF THE NSW CHILD SEXUAL ASSAULT SPECIALIST JURISDICTION PILOT (2005), available at
http://www.bocsar.nsw.gov.au/agdbasev7wr/bocsar/documents/pdf/r57.pdf (describing a
ninty-two-page analysis of a child sexual assault pilot program without any discussion of the
cost of the pilot or what the cost of expanding the pilot would be on court proceedings).
106 See Maggie Worth, How to Write a Proposal for a Pilot, EHOW, http://www.ehow
.com/how_6611523_write-proposal-pilot-project.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2014) (stating that
a pilot project proposal should “[e]xplain how the project will be evaluated . . . [and] what
results constitute a successful program”). See generally Eric Brown et al., Design and Analy-
sis of the Community Youth Development Study Longitudinal Cohort Sample, 33 EVALUATION
REV. 311, 312 (2009) (providing an excellent analysis of a large-scale longitudinal pilot study
analysis of an evidence-based program to reduce adolescent health and behavior problems).
See also Peter Z. Schochet, An Approach for Addressing Multiple Testing Problem in Social
Policy Impact Evaluations, 33 EVALUATION REV. 539, 539 (2009) (providing a discussion of
multiple testing problems in statistical analyses conducted across multiple outcomes and sub-
groups); Richard Berk, Evidence-Based Versus Junk-Based Evaluation Research: Some Les-
sons from 35 Years of the Evaluation Review, 35 EVALUATION REV. 191, 196 (2011)
(providing an excellent discussion of the inherent problems in casual modeling in survey in-
struments); Wade Horn & Joel Heerboth, Single-Case Experimental Designs and Program
Evaluation, 6 EVALUATION REV. 403, 405 (1982) (stating that proving causation in single case
experiments is more direct since it involves “taking repeated measures of one or more depen-
dent variables and systematically applying, and in some designs withdrawing, an independent
variable.  If the application or withdrawal of the independent variable is associated with sys-
temic changes in the dependent variable, then it is inferred that the independent variable has
caused the changes.”).
107 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 101, at 459 (arguing that evaluators and researchers of R
pilot projects “must protect themselves against . . . personal identification with the design or
delivery format of the program when measuring outcomes”). See also id. at 459–60 (stating
that assessment during the experimental pilot program should ask questions involving (1) ma-
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will better ensure that limited governmental resources will be intelli-
gently spent on pilot experiments that have the best odds of success and
expansion to full-scale governmental programs.
jor revisions, (2) modification and elimination of unattainable goals, (3) certain “radically al-
ter[ed] or expand[ed] . . . delivery components to achieve problematic objectives,” and (4)
expanding successful components).  In deciding whether to move to a full-scale project “[o]ne
approach is to estimate all possible benefits and costs in terms of monetary amounts and weigh
benefit against cost.”  Pal et al., supra note 14, at 272.  Alternatively, relative importance of R
various decision criteria may be established and the ratings under each of the criteria can be
assimilated into overall normalized scores. See also id. (arguing that “[i]rrespective of the
evaluation scheme the essence of the pilot study remains important to take the next big step,
i.e., implementation of the full scale project”).
